The security issues of VoIP are mainly concentrated on SIP and RTP protocols. Due to the addition of wireless networks and the lack of security management of wireless networks, security issues are more prominent. If the security authentication and data confidentiality are not enhanced in the VoWiFi system, it will pose a great threat to the system. This paper analyzes several security threats and ways of attack: Eavesdropping Sniffing VoIP calls, ManintheMiddle attacks, Denial of Service attacks, Call InterruptTIon and the establishment of erroneous calls are common threats in WLANs. VoIP technology makes it possible to implement telephony services based on data networks like the Internet. Compared with the traditional telephone service, this implementation mode can provide more integration functions, higher communication bandwidth, more stable communication quality and more flexible management capabilities, and can significantly reduce costs. Eavesdropping on a phone call and forwarding the relevant part of the communication, this is the most obvious kind of attack on VoIP, which can launch a man-in-the-middle attack on the cable network through many technical vulnerabilities. For example, using the ARP virus to forcibly attack the SIP server causes a threatening third party to intervene and the call fails. In a wireless communication environment, VoIP is more vulnerable to attacks without the protection of security mechanisms. Anyone with a computer, a suitable wireless adapter, and an eavesdropping software can easily steal VoIP calls from a WiFi network. Etherea eavesdropping software can identify VoIP calls in eavesdropped packets, and even use the SIP protocol to recover voice streams from eavesdropped RTP packets. Etherea eavesdropping software can also graphically view the call records of both communicating parties. What's more, Etherea eavesdropping software can also identify different RTP streams from the captured packets, and then extract the voice content from different packets, and resume the conversations of both parties and save them. In a wired switching network, the object of the man-in-the-middle attack is mostly the sniffing of the network service. According to the definition of the shared media network in the 802.11 LAN, once you obtain the password, you can eavesdrop on all the packets in the LAN. Once such a "middleman" appears between two wireless hosts, it is easy to launch an attack on the traffic flow. The man-in-the-middle attacks on the WLAN are concentrated in the first layer and the second layer in the OSI model. Attacks on the first layer often interfere with existing wireless access points. These interferences are usually performed by special interference software, or directly Garbage traffic to block access point channels. The parameters of these illegal access points are obtained from the parameters of the legitimate access point. The second layer of attacks mainly focuses on using a large number of forged end connections or ending authentication frames for attacks, so that the target host that is connecting with the legitimate access point is deleted. This is much more efficient than simple channel interference, and experienced attackers often combine the first layer of the second layer of attack to get better results. The attacker's goal is often to intervene in the transmission channel between the existing wireless user and the legitimate access point. If you want to attack a target, you must install the wireless adapter on the same computer. We can simulate this process. We use the adapter IPW2200b/g, and the compatible wireless adapter DWL-G650, which can make IPW2200b/g become An access point that uses this rogue access point to detect specific parameters of the wireless access point. The driver Madwifi will allow the Dwl-G650's wireless network card to operate in control mode, establish the actual wireless interface, and also enable the DWL-G650 to operate in different modes simultaneously. When the signal power of the two access points can be estimated, the attack can be launched. It is very difficult to control the signals transmitted in the corresponding channels of the legitimate access point, and the illegal nodes usually invade different channels to increase the possibility of attacks. The first layer and the second layer in the OSI model can be attacked by the method described above, which can greatly weaken or even delete the signal of the legitimate access point. The DWL-G650's network card and Madwifi driver can establish two network logical interfaces, one working in monitoring mode (ath0) and the other in operating mode (ath1). They work with channelless.1 with legitimate access points. The IPW2200b/g adapter (eth2) works on channelno.9 and is configured as a "default" legitimate access point via the wireless network card configuration (ESSID). Except for the DWL-G650, other devices that want to work on different channels must reside as wireless devices because the logical interface created by Madwifi cannot work on different channels unless it is in monitor mode. From the above command sequence, the command "brctl" establishes an Ethernet bridge that can be interconnected with other Ethernet. In the last line of the command, the configuration of the "ath0" interface and the use of the aireplay software are described. The aireplay software forcibly inserts the forged end frame frame into the wireless network through the "ath0" interface, which causes the user to be unable to connect to Legitimate access points and reduce the signal quality of channelno.1. There are many reasons why the base station is connected to an illegal access point and connected to other legitimate access points in parallel. For example, the access points are all working in the same channel. The main reason is that the signal power of most access points can be compared with each other. It is difficult for us to have enough devices to monitor legitimate access points. signal of. Since there are many exchanged frames stored in the ESSID, as long as the forwarding beacon is hidden in the ESSID, the network is unavailable. Once the beacon forwarding frame in the legal access point is detected, only a small number of forged end authentication frames are needed, and the attacks mentioned above will be multiplied, even if the signal power of the legitimate access point is more than illegal access. When the point is high, it is no exception. When normal wireless users cannot connect to the network via channelno.1, they will search for other channels. If you are lucky, you can also search for channelno. 9, the access point with preset parameters can be used. During the connection of the rogue access point to the base station, the legitimate access point also sends a beacon frame, and the forged end authentication frame must be inserted into the active communication channel to achieve the attack effect. Between the wireless base stations, the bridge between the access points makes it easy for an attacker to detect and send any form of data packets to the network. The eavesdropper has completely controlled the VoIP service flow between the base stations. Netfilter/iptables makes it easy to filter the exchanged packets. Denial of service attacks also threaten VoIP. A SIP useless message can cause a SIP service (either a user or a SIP server) to fail. These are obvious flaws if the server does not have an effective mechanism to control it ( Sometimes just simply ignoring these erroneous information, it is easy to become the target of the attack. The PROTOSSuiteTest software monitors the operation of the user and the SIP server and checks the commands executed by each PBX (Private Branch Exchange). PROTOS uses the bottom message of SIP, mainly the INVITE command, to identify defects in the server and related SIP users. This monitoring software can forward SIP messages generated by Ad hoc and attach some wrong syntax to it. The wrong syntax is an abnormal factor in the system, which often leads to inaccessibility.
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